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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-DOEs THE
RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH TRUMP THE RIGHT TO WORSHIP? Olmer v. City of
Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999).
I. INTRODUCTION
Howfar may men go in persuasion and communication and still not violate
the right of those whom they would influence?
The First Amendment guarantees the right of freedom of speech,2
but answering "why" determines the extent of the guarantee Free
speech rights to further self-governance, educate the public via a
"marketplace of ideas," and promote autonomy have been broadly
granted Yet, no matter how strong the right of speech appears, it has
never been absolute.- Within this expansive range, defining to what
degree speech should be protected is not always clear. In some cases,
the potential harm to society justifies restrictions on speech.' However,
fashioning rules that adequately balance the worth of free speech with
the state's interest in protecting other rights can be a difficult task.7
The outcome may depend on the value the court places on free speech
rights over other interests. This note explores whether free speech is
"part of the mix" of rights to be balanced or if it is at the "top of the
heap" of protected rights.
Anti-abortion protests targeted at specific churches, or their
members, place before the courts a potential conflict of rights between
freedom of speech and the freedom to worship. When free speech
concerns are raised within the backdrop of abortion rights, the issues
become even more emotionally charged. Both pro-choice activists and
anti-abortion groups use expressive conduct, or picketing, as an
effective way to raise public awareness of contrasting viewpoints.
I. Hill v. Colorado. 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2490 (2000) (quoting American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921)).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend i. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech." Id.
3. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.01 [2]. at 2-4 (1994).
4. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §
I. 1.2, at 751-56 (1997).
5. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799
(1985). "Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all
times." Id.
6. See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis
in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 943 (1994).
7. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 950-51 (2d
ed. 1988).
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However, this form of expressive activity often creates a tension
between picketers' free speech rights and other constitutionally
recognized rights. During the past ten years anti-abortion protests in
front of health clinics have become more regulated! Residential
picketing, focused on individual physicians who perform abortions,
became subject to regulation based on the Supreme Court's decision in
Frisby v. Schultz.9  Anti-abortion protestors, continuing to focus on
individual physicians, have chosen houses of worship as their newest
location.'0
This note examines a recent United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit decision that weighed the First Amendment freedom to
worship against First Amendment free speech rights and tipped the
scales in favor of free speech. In Olmer v. City of Lincoln," the court
struck down a city ordinance designed' to protect worshipers by limiting
"focused picketing" on sidewalks in front of churches. 2 This note
reviews the facts in the Olmer case. It then examines the test for
regulating expressive conduct and the rights and interests to be
balanced against free speech. It concludes with an analysis of the
court's reasoning and a discussion of the significance of the Olmer
decision.
11. FACTS
In February 1997, a group of anti-abortion protesters picketed
Westminster Presbyterian Church in Lincoln, Nebraska, objecting to
the appointment of Dr. Winston Crabb as an elder and deacon in the
church.'3 Dr. Crabb was a member of the congregation, and a medical
8. See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994);
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994).
9. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
10. See Alan Phelps, Note, Picketing and Prayer: Restricting Freedom of Expression
Outside Churches, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 271, 286-89 (1999).
11. 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999) (2-1 decision) (rehearing and rehearing en banc
denied (Dec. 9, 1999)).
12. Seeid. at 1178.
13. See Julia McCord, Pickets at the Door; Anti-Abortion Demonstrations at Westminster
Presbyterian Church in Lincoln Present a Dilemma for Members, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
July 19, 1997, at 59SF, available in 1997 WL 6313878. Protesters were primarily
members of an anti-abortion group named Rescue the Heartland, organized by Larry
Donlan and located in nearby Omaha. See id. Rescue the Heartland had written to the
church's governing council to request Dr. Crabb's removal from office and began
picketing when the church refused. See id.
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doctor who, as part of his medical practice, performed abortions. 4
Anti-abortion demonstrators, carrying signs reading "Winston Crabb,
Abortionist and Elder" and shouting protests, gathered at the entrances,
exits, and parking lots surrounding the church. 5 In addition to the
verbal protests, members of the group held signs depicting detailed
photographic images of bloody, aborted fetuses. 6 A number of the
protesters also carried video cameras and filmed parishioners as they
entered and left the church.'7
The picketing continued in this fashion for a year and a half.'
Church members found the picketing outside their church disruptive
and complained that it prevented them from peaceably attending
church. 9 Members' children showed signs of emotional distress such
as nightmares and frequent crying, and became anxious when ap-
proaching the church.2" Fifteen families, many of whom had small
children, left Westminster Presbyterian Church because of the
picketing.'
The Lincoln City Council ("Council") held a public hearing to
examine whether an ordinance prohibiting picketing at religious
services should be adopted.' At the hearing, church members
14. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1178.
15. See id. at 1178, 1182. Slogans also included "Dr. Crabb is Unfit to be an
Elder," "Life," and "I Corinthians 5:13," among others. See id.
16. See id. at 1183 (Bright, J., dissenting). Group members carried six to eight foot
tall signs showing enlarged photographs of bloody fetuses and unborn babies, which
church members said were being thrust into their path and into their children's faces as
they attended worship service. See Paul Hammel, Abortion Picketing Under Fire: A
Lincoln Religious Coalition Lines up in Support of Limits on Protests Outside a Presbyterian
Church, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 3, 1998, at 17, available in 1998 WL 5518567.
In a leaflet Donlan's group distributed to members of the congregation on February 16,
1997, Donlan wrote, "'[W]e will gather regularly along the sidewalk surrounding the
church . . . . I must warn you that many of our signs graphically represent the reality
of abortion."' McCord, supra note 13.
17. See McCord, supra note 13. One church member, a young mother and a lawyer,
called the signs "'horrifying"' but stated that she was more worried about what "'this
group will do to make a point."' McCord, supra note 13.
18. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1182 (Bright, J.. dissenting).
19. See Brief for Appellants at 3-7, Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th
Cir. 1999) (No. 984112) (referring to statements made by church members at the
Lincoln City Council Meeting on September 8, 1988).
20. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1182-83 (Bright, J., dissenting). A nine-year-old
testified that "[tihis lady stuck a bloody baby picture right in my face .... My tummy
was queasy and it was horrifying .... that time was the worst ever." Id. at 1183 (Bright,
J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
21. See Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1097 (D. Neb. 1998), affd,
192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999).
22. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1182 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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complained of verbal assaults on themselves and their children?3
Police officers had been patrolling during the protests and confirmed
verbal exchanges.24 The police, however, in contrast with the church
members, did not believe the picketers' actions rose to the level of
"threatening"
25
In September 1998, the Council passed an ordinance seeking to
restrict "focused picketing 26 of churches and other religious establish-
ment's premises." The Mayor of Lincoln vetoed the ordinance, the
council overrode the veto, and the ordinance was enacted as law.
28
23. See id. at 1183 (Bright, J., dissenting). Members reported comments directed
at children, such as "[yjou're lucky Dr. Crabb didn't murder you." Paul Hammel, Picket
Limit Proposal Gets Hearing: The Lincoln City Council Will Consider an Ordinance That
Would Restrict Anti-Abortion Protests Near Churches, OMAHA WoRLD-HERALD, Aug. 18,
1998, at 13SF, available in 1998 WL 5516345.
24. See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
25. See id. Members of the congregation attending the City Council hearing
asserted that the picketing was intimidating and that protestors behaved differently
when police were present. See Appellants' Brief at 6, Olmer (No. 98-4112).
26. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1179. Section 9.20.090(a)(3) of the Lincoln, Nebraska
Municipal Code defined "focused picketing" as follows:
[T]he act of one or more persons stationing herself, himself or themselves
outside religious premises on the exterior grounds, or on the sidewalks,
streets or other part of the right of way in the immediate vicinity of religious
premises, or moving in a repeated manner past or around religious premises,
while displaying a banner, placard, sign or other demonstrative material as
a part of their expressive conduct.
Id.
27. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1178. Section 9.20.090(b) of the Lincoln, Nebraska
Municipal Code provides as follows:
It shall be deemed an unlawful disturbance of the peace for any person
intentionally or knowingly to engage in focused picketing of a scheduled
religious activity at any time within the period from one-half hour before to
one-half hour after the scheduled activity, at any place (1) on the religious
organization's exterior premises, including its parking lots; or (2) on the
portion of the right of way including any sidewalk on the same side of the
street and adjoining the boundary of the religious premises, including its
parking lots; or (3) on the portion of the right of way adjoining the boundary
of the religious premises which is a street or roadway including any median
within such street or roadway; or (4) on any public property within 50 feet
of a property boundary line of the religious premises, if an entrance to the
religious organization's building or an entrance to its parking lot is located
on the side of the property bounded by that property line. Notwithstanding,
the foregoing description of areas where focused picketing is restricted, it is
hereby provided that no restriction in this ordinance shall be deemed to apply
to focused picketing on the right of way beyond the curb line completely
across the street from any such religious premises.
Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
28. SeeOlmer, 192 F.3dat 1178.
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Two days later, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal district court29
seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the
ordinance, claiming that the ordinance violated the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment by denying them the right to engage in
peaceful picketing. 0
On September 30, 1998, the United States District Court for the
District of Nebraska issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting
enforcement of the ordinance.3' A preliminary injunction followed on
November 4, 1998, on the basis that the ordinance was not narrowly
tailored to serve the government's motivating interest?2  The City of
Lincoln ("City") appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, claiming that the ordinance met constitutional require-
ments by imposing only content-neutral limitations on the time, place,
and manner of speech and thus was narrowly tailored to protect the
government's significant interests in (1) protecting young children from
frightening images; (2) preserving citizens' rights to exercise religion
freely, and (3) maintaining public order.3  The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's decision, holding that although the city had
an interest in protecting children, the ordinance was not narrowly
tailored enough to serve this interest without abridging too much
speech.34
III. BACKGROUND
Low costs combined with high publicity value make expressive
conduct, such as picketing, an effective way for people on both sides
of an issue to make their voices heard. Because of this, picketing is
often viewed as a constructive method of bringing about social
change.35 The United States Supreme Court has long considered this
type of expressive conduct protected as free speech?6  However, as
picketing becomes more focused or targeted, the coercive aspects of
29. See id. at 1184 (Bright, J., dissenting).
30. See Olmer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
31. See id. at 1096.
32. See id. at 1094.
33. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180.
34. Seeid. at l182.
35. See Sylvia Arizmendi, Residential Picketing: Will the Public Forum Follow Us
Home?, 37 How. L.J. 495, 506 (1994).
36. See. id. at 503. Peaceful picketing was first held entitled to First Amendment
protection in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), a labor case in which an
employee was convicted under a loitering and picketing statute for picketing his
workplace. See id. at 502.
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this form of expressive activity create a tension between picketers'
right to free speech and the privacy rights of those they are trying to
influence?' This section describes the test used to regulate expressive
conduct such as picketing. It then reviews the history of residential
picketing cases. Finally, it looks at the privacy concerns that need to
be balanced against free speech rights in focused picketing decisions.
A. The Test for Regulating Expressive Conduct
Expressive conduct, although regarded as an important facet of
free speech, is not protected to the same extent as pure speech. 8
Nevertheless, a state's ability to enact restrictions is limited by certain
factors.39 A court initially looks at whether the conduct takes place in
a public forum, limited public forum, or non-public forum.' Streets
and sidewalks, where most picketing activity normally takes place, are
traditionally considered places open for public discussion and therefore
fall within public forum guidelines for restrictions.4 The government
can set reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in
public areas but the regulation must (1) be content-neutral; (2) be
narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate government interest; and (3)
allow ample alternative channels of communication.4
1. Content-Neutral v. Content-Based Regulations
The proper level of scrutiny is determined by whether the statute
regulates based on the content of speech.43 As an initial matter, the
regulation must be content-neutral." Content-based restrictions are
37. See id. at 500.
38. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). "[Tlhe First and Fourteenth
Amendments [do not] afford the same kind of freedom to those who would
communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets
and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech." Id.
39. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
40. See id. at 45-46.
41. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). Justice
Roberts stated in Hague that sidewalks for "time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, . . . and discussing public questions." Id.
42. See Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
43. See id.
44. See SMOLLA, supra note 3, § 3.02 [31, at 3-33. Smolla points out that "[g]enuine
time, place, or manner regulations are by definition content-neutral" or the court could
not apply the standard of review for this type of ordinance. Id. § 3.02[31, at 3-33
(emphasis in original).
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presumptively unconstitutional and are subjected to strict scrutiny due
to concern that the government may be suppressing speech because it
disagrees with the speaker's view.45 A content-neutral regulation limits
expression based on when, where, or how a communication is
delivered, rather than the substance of the message." Content-neutral
regulations are subject to an "intermediate" level of scrutiny because
they are less likely to censor specific viewpoints4" Therefore, time,
place, and manner restrictions can be enacted when an ordinance is
content-neutral.48  Regulations having an incidental effect on some
speakers, but not others, may still be considered content-neutral if
they serve governmental purposes not related to the content of the
message.49
2. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest
Even if the regulation is content-neutral, however, the govern-
ment must not use broader means than necessary to achieve its
aims.5  The second element of analysis requires restrictions on
speech to be "narrowly tailored" to serve a "significant government
interest."'" This is the most fact-sensitive section of the test, and the
two considerations are balanced against each other.5 2 The govern-
ment's interest may be extremely important, but if the means chosen
to limit speech are substantially broader than necessary, the
regulation will fail."
The Court has considered a wide range of governmental
interests significant enough to require regulation, including
45. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating that regulation
based on content is "presumptively invalid"); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 641-42 (1994). "Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech
because of its content." Id. at 642.
46. See SMOLLA, supra note 3, § 3.0213l, at 3-32.
47. See id.at 2-10.
48. See Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
49. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). For example,
an ordinance banning residential picketing can be upheld even if anti-abortion
protestors are the only group affected because the ordinance can apply to other groups
as well. See Martha A. Field, Abortion and the First Amendment, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
545, 549 (1996).
50. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 789.
51. See Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
52. See ALLAN IDES & CHRIsTOPHER N. MAY, CoNsTIuTIONAL LAW: INDIvIDuAL
RIGHTS § 8.4.2, at 325 (1998).
53. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 800.
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preserving privacy interests, protecting public safety, and maintain-
ing the normal activity of a school. 4  Whether the interest is
significant will often relate to the normal activity of the location
where the message is disseminated." If the conduct or expression
disrupts the flow of the activities usually undertaken in the location,
then the government has more freedom to regulate.56 However, the
interest in allowing free speech is strong and the magnitude of the
government's countervailing interest makes a difference when
allowing regulation. 7
To be narrowly tailored, a restriction must serve the govern-
ment's legitimate interest without unnecessarily interfering with
freedom of speech.58 Generally, a regulation is considered narrowly
tailored if it restricts only the particular source of "evil" it is
designed to eliminate." Courts are not required, however, to
determine whether the government has an alternative method that
might be less intrusive."
3. Ample Alternative Channels for Communication
Finally, in addition to being content-neutral and narrowly
tailored, the regulation must leave open "alternative channels for
communication."61 This requirement can be met if there are other
methods of communication62 or other locations where the message
54. See Luke T. Cadigan, Note, Balancing the Interests: A Practical Approach to
Restrictions on Expressive Conduct in the Anti-Abortion Protest Context, 32 B.C. L. REV. 835,
853 & n. 117 (1991). See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (preserving
residential privacy); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981) (protecting visitor's safety at local fairgrounds); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972) (maintaining normal activity of school).
55. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116. The Court in Grayned indicated that "[t]he
crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Id.
56. See id.
57. See Cadigan, supra note 54, at 889.
58. SeeGrayned, 408 U.S. at 114.
59. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485.
60. See SMOLLA, supra note 3, § 3.02[3], at 3-37 to -38. The court in Ward stated
that although a regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's interests
it "need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so." Ward, 491 U.S.
at 798.
61. See IDES& MAY, supra note 52, § 8.4.3, at 327-28.
62. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949). In Kovacs, the Court upheld an
ordinance limiting loudspeakers on trucks in public streets. See id. Restricting the way
the message was conveyed was appropriate because the message could still be
communicated by pamphlets or other methods. See id.
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can be communicated.63 Courts have not set defined guidelines for
what places or methods constitute "alternative channels," but as
long as all means of communication are not totally eliminated an
ordinance will not usually fail this section of the test."
B. Residential Picketing
In a residential area, focused picketing intrudes on privacy more
than other forms of expressive conduct, such as handbills or door-
to-door solicitation, because it is aimed directly at a particular
residence or person.65 When picketing focuses on a specific place
or individual, it involves harassment and coercion of the resident or
captive audience." As a factual matter, such focused picketing
usually continues over a longer period of time than other expression,
often occurring for weeks, months, or even years.67 These factors
may lead even those who are champions of free speech to let their
concern for privacy outweigh their interest in free speech.6"
In 1969, the Supreme Court considered the issue of residential
picketing in Gregory v. City of Chicago.6 9 In Gregory, a group of
marchers, led by comedian and activist Dick Gregory, picketed the
house of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley.7" The group wanted to
pressure the mayor to oust a school superintendent who they
believed to have hampered the school desegregation process.71 The
crowd surrounding the house increased to over 1000 bystanders.72
The police asked the demonstrators to stop.73  When they refused,
63. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 655 (1981). In Heffron, the Court upheld a regulation prohibiting the distribution
of materials on the fairgrounds at places other than registered booths. See id. The Court
noted that the Krishna could reach the audience at locations other than the fairgrounds
or by renting a booth at the fairgrounds. See id.
64. See SMOLLA, supra note 3, § 3.02[31, at 3-39.
65. See Arizmendi, supra note 35, at 534.
66. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988).
67. See Arizmendi, supra note 35, at 534.
68. See id. at 534-35; Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to
Be Spoken to?, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 153, 161 (1972) (noting that even Justices Black and
Douglas were "willing to subordinate their interest in the primacy of the First
Amendment to their concerns for privacy" in the context of residential picketing).
69. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
70. See id. at 115 (Black, J., concurring).
71. See id. (Black, J., concurring).
72. See Arizmendi, supra note 35, at 535.
73. See Gregory, 394 U.S. at 116 (Black, J., concurring).
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the police arrested many of the marchers.74  The Court reversed
Gregory's conviction for breaching the peace, but the majority
opinion did not discuss harassment, an issue Justice Black felt the
majority had overlooked. 75  Justice Black observed that if a govern-
ment is "powerless" to regulate conduct, then people's homes would
be subject to picketing by anyone attempting to convert the residents
to "new views, new morals, and a new way of life.
76
Not until 1988, in Frisby v. Schultz, 7 7 did the Court specifically
consider whether residential picketing could be banned.78 A group
ranging in size from eleven to forty picketed a doctor's home in
Brookfield, Wisconsin on at least six occasions during a one-month
period in 1985. 79 Due to numerous complaints from citizens, the
town passed an ordinance flatly banning all residential picketing.80
The Frisby Court upheld the ordinance, stating that it was narrowly
tailored to serve the significant governmental interest of residential
privacy.8" The Court voiced concerns about the coercive effects of
the speech, noting that this kind of picketing was intrusive rather
than informative.8 2 The court upheld the ordinance, agreeing that
the state had a substantial interest in banning picketing directed at
unwilling listeners.83 The Court pointed out that the residents had
no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech.84
74. See id. (Black, J., concurring).
75. See id. at 113 (Black, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 125 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black also stated that if regulation
were not permissible "public buildings would cease to be available for the purposes for
which they were constructed and dedicated whenever demonstrators and picketers
wanted to use them for their own purposes." Id. (Black, J., concurring).
77. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
78. See id. at 476. The Court had previously reviewed a residential picketing
ordinance in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). See Arizmendi, supra note 35, at 537-
38. The Carey case involved a statute that banned all picketing in residential areas with
the exception of labor picketing. See id. While the court discussed First Amendment
concerns, the case was eventually decided on equal protection grounds. See id.
79. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 476.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 488. The Court relied on the singular form of the words "residence"
and "dwelling" to determine that the ordinance was intended to limit only picketing
focused on, and in front of, a particular residence. See id. at 482.
82. See id. at 486. "The type of picketers banned ... do not seek to disseminate a
message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in
an especially offensive way." Id.
83. See id. at 488.
84. See id. at 487. In free speech cases, the burden generally falls on the unwilling
listener in public places to avoid the speech. See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-19, at 948.
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Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissenting separately, read the
ordinance as restricting all picketing in a residential neighborhood,
but were troubled by the protestors' methods.8 5 Brennan agreed that
intrusive or unduly coercive speech is subject to more exacting
regulation and that the facts in this case illustrated why this is true. 6
Justice Brennan referred to sign-carrying, slogan-shouting protestors
who regularly converged on the doctor's home and, in addition to
demonstrating, told young children in the neighborhood that the
doctor was a baby killer.8 7 Indicating that substantial regulation is
permitted to neutralize the intrusive or unduly coercive aspects of
residential picketing, Justice Brennan explained that government
regulation of the number of picketers, the hours when picketing
could take place, or the noise level would be constitutionally
permissible. 8  Justice Stevens acknowledged that the form with
which a speaker communicates might be offensive, independent of
the intended message, and he stated that "picketing for the sole
purpose of imposing psychological harm . . . is [not] constitutionally
protected." 9
C. Balancing Free Speech Rights with Privacy Rights
Privacy rights have emerged from the "penumbra" of several
constitutional amendments.9" The First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments are all implicated.9' Justice Louis Brandeis first
defined the right to privacy as "the right 'to be let alone."' 92  While
this right has been used to great effect in deciding constitutional
85. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 497 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
86. See id. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)
88. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Picketing is a form of speech that, by
virtue of its repetition of message and often hostile presentation, may be disruptive of
an environment irrespective of the substantive message conveyed." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
90. See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 15-3, at 1309.
91. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
92. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890) (quoting Judge Cooley).
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issues,9 3 there is no well-defined standard for what the right to
privacy entails.94
Courts are wary when asked to limit free speech in public areas,
but justices have acknowledged a listener's interest in the quality of
the surrounding environment.95  When balancing a listener's
autonomy interest against government regulation of free speech in
the context of residential picketing, the special "sanctity of the
home" tips the scales.96 But the Frisby Court's concern about the
coercive effects of focused picketing and the privacy rights of
captive audiences can be applied in other contexts.97 Commentators
have argued that a flat geographical line protecting unwilling
listeners in their homes but not when they venture out in public does
not necessarily serve free speech interests. 98
1. Protecting the Unwilling Listener
Free speech has great protection in public places, and unwilling
listeners are protected from offensive messages only when "sub-
stantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner."99  Based on this standard, a listener must
93. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (concluding that the
Constitution protects a fundamental right to privacy which includes the right to make
intimate decision on use of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(upholding the right to an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(reaffirming Roe and establishing "undue burden" standard).
94. See Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 85, 107 (1991). Strauss quotes Professor Thompson: "Perhaps the most striking
thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what
it is." Id. at 107-08 (quoting Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. &
PuB. AFF. 295, 295 (1975)).
95. See TRIE, supra note 7, § 12-19, at 948. See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 84 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated that
"regulations of form and context may strike a constitutionally appropriate balance
between the advocate's right to convey a message and the recipient's interest in the
quality of his environment." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
96. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
97. See id. at 484-87. See also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Is There an Obligation to
Listen?, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 489, 520-21 (1999) (advocating that the government
should protect unwilling listeners no matter what the location).
98. See Jacobs, supra note 97, at 490-91. Jacobs argues that the "significance of the
listener's physical location becomes important only when it correctly signals the
balance between competing constitutional interests of free speech and privacy." Id. at
491.
99. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). See also Strauss, supra note 94,
at 108. Professor Strauss describes the principal privacy interests in the captive
audience context as the right to make individual choices, the right to repose, and the
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simply turn away from an offensive message in the absence of an
interest strong enough to justify regulation." °  Only if a person is
considered "captive" does the required showing lessen.' O' When
people are in a location where they cannot freely leave or where
they have a right to remain and the speech is not easily avoided, the
invasion of their privacy rights creates a greater justification for
regulation. 102
In a global society, there are willing and unwilling listeners at
most locations, and people are seldom totally captive. Accordingly,
protection from unwanted speech is limited in most public places.'0 3
Protection as a member of a "captive audience" is more likely
accorded for the home.'O°  Outside the home, it is less clear that
being forced to hear unwanted speech permits the government to
regulate. The question becomes: When does the responsibility to
turn away become too much of a burden for the listener and
outweigh the right to free speech?'0 5
2. Picketing as Harassment/Coercion
The coercive element or psychological harm identified in
residential picketing concerned the Frisby Court.' °6  Under this
theory, regulating focused picketing is appropriate when it is being
used to intrude or coerce, rather than communicate.' 7  Generally,
speech in a public place does not lose its protected character
right to be free from offense. See Strauss, supra note 94, at 108.
100. See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-19, at 948.
101. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. When courts refer to captive audiences they often
consider the ease with which the audience can avoid unwanted speech. See Frisby, 487
U.S. at 485-86 (difficult for homeowner to avoid speech); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (easy to dispose of materials); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21
(audience can avert eyes).
102. See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 12-19, at 949 n.24.
103. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (presence of unwilling listeners in a public courtroom
does not justify regulating offensive speech); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (drive-in theatre screen not obtrusive enough that privacy interests
are invaded).
104. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
105. See Strauss, supra note 94, at 89. "The descriptive statement that people are
subjected to unwanted stimuli is not the same as saying that normatively they should be
forced to endure them." Id. at 95 (emphasis in original).
106. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486. Commentators have noted that theoretically the
right to picket may seem fundamental but that "an actual protest may be a form of
coercion and intimidation resembling ...abuse rather than ... a right." Arizmendi,
supra note 35, at 497.
107. See Jacobs, supra note 97, at 510.
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"simply because it may embarrass others or attempt to coerce them
into action."'08  Nevertheless, Frisby indicates that coercion and
harassment can play a factor in regulating the time, place, and
manner of speech."°
Defining "harassment" in any context is difficult for courts and
legislatures, but could be especially difficult in free speech cases." 0
Individuals usually engage in expressive conduct or picketing to
communicate a message. Principles underlying free speech theory
are based on informing people about issues and seeking to persuade
others of the value of a certain viewpoint."' There is a difference,
however, between persuasive public speech and targeted
expression." 2  Free speech rights give picketers the opportunity to
deliver their message, but endless repetition to the same unwilling
listeners lessens the communicative value of the speech and makes
it more like coercion.
' 3
Focused picketing can also interfere with an individual's
autonomy interest in making independent decisions on the issues
being protested." 4  The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit distinguished protected speech from unprotected
harassment as the difference between attempting to persuade people
to the merits of what is being said and coercively pressuring them
to change their behavior."' The "nature, location, and context" of
108. NAACP v. Claibom, 458 U.S. 886,910(1982).
109. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487.
110. See Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating
Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests-Section 11,
29 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1163, 1165 (1996).
111. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 11. 1.2, at 750-56.
112. See Brownstein, supra note 110, at 1166. Professor Brownstein distinguishes
the following three types of speech: persuasive speech aimed at the public at large;
targeted private speech expressed between individuals on private concerns; and targeted
public speech that is relevant to matters of public concern, but is purposefully directed
at individuals. See id. at 1166-68.
113. See Brownstein, supra note 110, at 1172.
114. See Anne D. Lederman, Comment, Free Choice and the First Amendment or Would
You Read This if I Held It in Your Face and Refused to Leave?, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
1287, 1323 (1995).
115. See Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 395 (2d Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(Winter, J., concurring). Judge Winter concluded that picketers have the right to
criticize but stated:
[C]oercion or obstruction does not gain First Amendment protection simply
because no one is physically injured, traffic moves, and private property is
not invaded. A placid scene that is the result of citizens not going where they
wish to be in order to avoid bullying is hardly consistent with a marketplace
of ideas.
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some targeted speech makes the harm caused to people who have
difficulty avoiding the message outweigh the persuasive impact.I
16
Because of the effects felt by both their nuclear and spiritual
families, doctors whose homes and churches become targets for
focused picketing campaigns are prime examples of those who feel
coercive pressure.' The method of forcing people into "new
views" is not compatible with either the "autonomy interest" or
"marketplace of ideas" theory of free expression."'
3. Extending Frisby's Premise to the Freedom to Worship
Our democracy is built on the right to question authorities,
practices, and beliefs, whether political or religious. Therefore, the
opportunity to convey a thought-provoking message to a religious
organization is firmly within the bounds of First Amendment
protection." '9  However, in locations where the quality of the
environment is a key concern, should a person have the right to
deliver that message in an offensive, disturbing manner? 2 °
Focused picketing outside religious sites raises many of the
same concerns illustrated by picketing at residences or abortion
Id. at 397 (Winter, J., concurring). Originally in Schenck, a panel for the Second Circuit
invalidated a cease-and-desist order based on First Amendment protection for sidewalk
counselors outside an abortion clinic. See Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 67 F.3d 359
(2d Cir. 1995) (2-1 decision), vacated in part. 67 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). The dissent's position that the order was not
designed to suppress the anti-abortion protestors' message but to prevent people from
being badgered at close range was vindicated when the en banc decision vacated the
panel decision. See Brownstein, supra note 110, at 1188.
116. See Brownstein, supra note 110, at 1170.
117. In 1995, a jury in Texas awarded Dr. Norman Tompkins $8,600,000 in
damages in a tort case for privacy invasion and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See Plaintiffs' Attorney Stresses Theme of Psychological Terrorism, INSIDE LITIG.,
Dec. 1995, at 4. Protestors picketed Dr. Tompkins's office, home, and church from
October 1992 to July 1993. See Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 672 (N.D. Tex.
1998). Dr. Tompkins's children were afraid to visit his home, his daughter's wedding
had to be held at a secret location outside town, and he eventually closed his Dallas
practice of 26 years. See id. at 673. Reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of
law, the district court judge determined that the protestors' First Amendment rights did
not bar the jury verdict although it lowered the damages to $5,048,000. See id. at 675,
689.
118. See Lederman, supra note 114, at 1323.
119. See Brownstein, supra note 110, at 1204.
120. See id. Brownstein states that participants at events of religious significance
"deserve an opportunity to experience without unreasonable interference the feelings




clinics. On one hand, picketers wish to address the particular people
who are at these locations and might not have such a concentrated
opportunity elsewhere.' On the other hand, someone attending a
religious service is engaged in an intensely personal act much like
actions in the home or medical services context. 22  In these
instances, the offensive speech of strangers may be particularly
intrusive. 123
Few courts have dealt specifically with the issue of regulating
focused picketing outside churches.'24 The only similar case in the
Eighth Circuit involved demonstrators who actually entered the
church and disrupted services. 2  However, the Supreme Court, and
other courts following its lead, has held valid regulations on focused
picketing, including buffer zones, time limitations, and sign
restrictions.'26  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recently upheld a city ordinance prohibiting all demonstra-
tion activity within a certain distance of health care facilities and
places of worship. 27  The Ninth Circuit held the ordinance to be
narrowly tailored and relied on the government's strong interest in
protecting worshipers from intimidation and harassment and
ensuring their access to places of worship to sustain the ordinance.
21
When rights like freedom of speech and freedom to worship come
into direct conflict, careful evaluation of the degree of burden on
121. See id. at 1174-76.
122. See id. at 1204.
123. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (stating that focused picketing
intrudes on targeted resident in an especially offensive way).
124. See Phelps, supra note 10, at 287.
125. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding demonstrators
did not have a right to enter a cathedral and disrupt services). In Action, the case
involved protests by members of the black community against the actions of a
predominately white church. See id. at 1229. The court affirmed an injunction
protecting the rights of churchgoers because the picketers actually entered the church
and disrupted services. See id. at 1238. The injunction, however, was remanded to the
district court to revise the ordinance to permit peaceful picketing to protect plaintiff's
First Amendment rights. See id.
126. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488 (upholding ordinance banning focused picketing in
front of residences); Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1142 (1999) (upholding buffer zone around houses of worship);
St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1996), review denied, 260 Kan. 995 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997)
(upholding 214-foot buffer zone, time restrictions, and sign regulations).
127. See Edwards, 150 F.3d at 1215.
128. See id. at 1215-16.
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each party could lead to reasonable accommodation of the conflict-
ing rights.' 29
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In Olmer v. City of Lincoln,3' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit struck down a city ordinance designed to limit
"focused picketing" on the sidewalks and right-of-ways in front of
churches and religious premises as unconstitutional. 3 ' The majority
held that the ordinance restricted more speech than necessary to
serve the government's significant interest in protecting children
from harmful materials.'32  The dissent, however, was primarily
concerned with protecting an individual's freedom to worship and
the privacy rights affected when church members receive unwanted
and coercive messages.'33 This section reviews the majority and
dissenting opinions in an effort to show how the choice of interest
and the weight given to that interest led to the court's decision. In
Olmer, as in many cases dealing with the constitutionality of a
government regulation, the interest on which the court focuses is
outcome-determinative. 1
34
A. The Majority Opinion
Initially, the court noted that peaceful picketing is expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment, that sidewalks are
places of public assembly, and that the government's ability to
regulate speech in such public areas is limited.'35 The court then
applied the test for time, place, and manner regulations in a public
forum. 1
36
The court of appeals, like the district court, assumed that the
ordinance was content-neutral because, on its face, the ordinance
129. See Brownstein, supra note 110, at 1205-06.
130. 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999) (2-1 decision).
131. See id. at 1182. Judge Richard Arnold wrote the two-to-one majority opinion.
See id. at 1178. Judge Bright wrote a dissenting opinion. See id. at 1182.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1188 (Bright, J., dissenting).
134. See Cadigan, supra note 54, at 889.
135. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1179.
136. See id. at 1180. This standard for restrictions on speech in public was
established by the Supreme Court in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass 'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). See discussion supra section III A.
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did not attempt to regulate speech based on viewpoint.'" Both
courts agreed that the City's interest in protecting young children
from "frightening images" was constitutionally significant. 3  The
court of appeals, however, declined to extend the City's legitimate
interest beyond that point.'39 Both courts agreed that a gruesome
picture, such as a dead body, would affect young children. 40  Absent
such pictures, however, both courts held that the City does not have
a legitimate interest in shielding young children from the presence
of an anti-abortion protestor.1
41
The Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the ordinance was
"narrowly tailored" to serve the legitimate interest of protecting
children.'42 Reasoning that the ordinance banned not only speech
that would be psychologically damaging to children, but also speech
that was directed toward adults, the court held the ordinance
overbroad.'43  As the court explained, the ordinance made the
carrying of any sign unlawful, no matter what the sign said or
depicted. 44  The court stated that while parishioners might not like
the signs or agree with them, disagreement over content was not a
137. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180. The district court assumed the ordinance was
content-neutral because "(1) the ordinance facially bans all 'focused picketing'
regardless of the apparent message sought to be conveyed; and (2) the Lincoln City
Council's purpose in passing the ordinance and overriding the mayor's veto was ...
unrelated to the content of the expression conveyed by those engaging in focused
picketing." Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1098-99 (D. Neb. 1998),
aff'd, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999).
138. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180. Protection of children has been acknowledged as
an important interest. See Reno v. ACLU. 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (recognizing a
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials); Sable
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (recognizing compelling
interest in the well-being of minors). In obscenity cases this protection is based on the
premise that freedom of speech "presupposes" some degree of maturity, intelligence,
and discipline on the audience's part, and government intervention is appropriate if the
audience lacks these qualifications. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADMON:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 54 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). However, the Supreme
Court has also declared that speech cannot be limited to what would be "suitable for a
sandbox." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983).
139. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180.
140. See id. The district court stated that, absent the picture of a dead body, there
was no "credible and unbiased" evidence that a sign-carrying protestor hanned a young
child. Id. The court of appeals noted that the City offered evidence contradicting this







FREE SPEECH AND THE RIGHT TO WORSHIP
sufficient basis under the First Amendment to justify the ordinance
that the City sought. 4 '
The court then turned to the City's interest in preserving the
right of its citizens to freely exercise their religion. 46  The court
recognized that in theory the free exercise of religion is a substantial
interest, but did not think it applied in this instance.'47 The court
compared this case with its previous decision in Action v. Gannon'
stating that freedom of religion interests would apply when
protestors enter the church without permission and interrupt church
services with their own speech.' 49 The court also disagreed with the
City's contention that the ordinance should be upheld based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Frisby v. Schultz.'50  Fearing that
granting churches the same privacy protection as the home would
proscribe too much speech, the court limited Frisby to its facts.''
Finally, the court addressed the City's interest in public order.'52
The court recognized that in some circumstances, such as keeping
streets free of obstructions or preventing distractions for traffic
safety, the City has a sufficient interest in regulation.' The court,
however, contended that these purposes could probably be achieved
by current ordinances regulating traffic and public safety, and that
this ordinance was not necessary to achieve those aims. 54
B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Bright did not find freedom of religion as
abstract a concept as did the majority.'55 He observed that the
145. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180. The court appears to assume that church
members' concerns were based solely on disagreement with the signs. However, even
church members who were "pro-life" were "offended by the picketing" and concerned
about their children. McCord, supra note 13.
146. See Olmer, 192 F.3dat 1180.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1181-82 (discussing Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir.
1971)). See also supra note 124 and accompanying text.
149. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1181-82. Picketers in the Olmer case had confronted Dr.
Crabb in the parking lot and entered the church offices, but not during religious
services. See McCord, supra note 13.
150. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1182-83 (discussing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988) (upholding ordinance prohibiting focused picketing in front of a residence)).




155. See id. at 1182 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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specific issue in this case-whether the government has a signifi-
cant interest in protecting those who attend religious services from
unwanted messages-is one of first impression in the Eighth
Circuit." 6  The foundation for Judge Bright's dissent was the
Supreme Court's ruling in Frisby, which recognized a significant
government interest in protecting unwilling listeners' privacy
rights." To Judge Bright, the same principle that protected
residential privacy in Frisby should protect churchgoers' rights to
attend services free from interference."'
Judge Bright noted that the First Amendment does not deprive
communities of the power to enact legislation that limits speech." 9
Emphasizing the Supreme Court's concern with protecting the
"unwilling listener" or "captive audience" in his home, Judge Bright
pointed out that members of Westminster are captives of unwanted
speech when attending their spiritual home. 6" He stressed the
City's strong interest in ensuring a right to exercise religious beliefs
free from intrusive and unduly coercive messages.' 6' Judge Bright
further observed that the Ninth Circuit had recently upheld a similar
ordinance in Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara62 based on this
premise. 61
Judge Bright explained that the City's interest is significant for
three reasons.'" First, the fundamental right to worship is as
156. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1184 (Bright J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 1182 (Bright, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 1184-85 (Bright, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 1184 (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Bright quoted from Gregory v. City
of Chicago in which Justice Black stated that localities could legislate "'to protect the
public from the kind of boisterous and threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility
of spots selected by the people either for homes .... or [other public] buildings that
require peace and quiet to carry out their functions ...... " Id. (Bright, J., dissenting)
(quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)).
160. See id. at 1185-86 (Bright, J.. dissenting). The Frisby Court's primary concern
was the sanctity of the home, but the Court also stated: "The First Amendment permits
the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience
cannot avoid the objectionable speech." Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487.
161. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1186 (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Bright mentioned
the dissent in Frisby in which Justice Brennan noted that protestors warned young
children away from the abortion doctor's house because he was a "baby killer." See id.
at 1186 n.5 (Bright, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated in Frisby that "[slurely it is
within the government's power to enact regulations as necessary to prevent such
intrusive and coercive abuses." Id. (Bright J., dissenting) (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at
494 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
162. 150 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1142 (1999).
163. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1185 & n.3 (Bright J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 1185 (Bright, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 23
FREE SPEECH AND THLE RIGHT TO WORSHIP
important as the right to privacy within one's home because it is a
long-recognized freedom in our society and is protected by the First
Amendment. 6 ' Second, houses of worship, no matter what religion,
are sacred places where people seek spiritual replenishment, and the
government has a strong interest in protecting tranquility at these
sites."'s Judge Bright noted that attending church at Westminster
was anything but tranquil, and members were being forced to
choose between attending church and enduring the demonstrations
or forfeiting their fundamental right to worship.'67 Third, churchgo-
ers assaulted with gory pictures and verbal abuse present the
paradigm of the "unwilling listener" or "captive audience.""'6
Judge Bright also concluded that the ordinance was narrowly
tailored because it restricted "focused picketing" in a limited way
by only restricting activities within a certain time period and in a
limited area. 69  Picketers were able to use the sidewalk and
entryways to the church at any time and were only constrained from
carrying large materials, such as signs or banners, for a short period
of time before and after religious services. 70 Picketers could pass
out leaflets at any time.'7' Judge Bright challenged the majority's
characterization of the adult churchgoer's opposition as being based
on dislike or disagreement with the signs."" He pointed out that
objecting to jeering shouts, graphic images, and psychological
distress amounts to more than mere disapproval of the content of a
message." Judge Bright also maintained that the plaintiffs had
165. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Bright's historical argument comes from
the Constitution's protection of freedom of religion in the First Amendment and the
Declaration of Independence permitting individuals certain unalienable rights in order
to pursue happiness. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting). See also U.S. CONST. amend I; THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
166. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1185 (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Bright referred to
Justice Black's description of the home as "the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and
the sick" in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. II1, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1185 (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Bright remarked that "[tihis
description applies with equal force to houses of worship." Id. (Bright, J., dissenting).
167. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1185 (Bright, J., dissenting).
168. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting).
169. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Bright based his opinion on the same test
used in Frisby. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting). If an ordinance "[does] no more than
eliminate the exact source of the evil it [seeks] to remedy[,J" it is sufficiently narrow.
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984).
170. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1186 (Bright, J., dissenting).
171. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting).
172. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1187 (Bright, J., dissenting).
173. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting). Even pro-life members were distressed about
the picketing. See McCord, supra note 13.
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more than ample alternative channels of communication. 74 They
could continue to protest across the street from the church or at any
other location except the sidewalks and entryways bordering the
church's property during the restricted time periods.'"
Finally, Judge Bright questioned the court's use of Action v.
Gannon 7 ' as precedent for declaring the Lincoln ordinance unconsti-
tutional.' "  The specific issue in Action was whether individuals
could be enjoined from entering a cathedral and disrupting
services."7 8 This case, however, was about the government's power
to enforce restrictions on picketers near religious premises.179 He
interpreted Action to stand for the broad proposition that protestors
should not be allowed to interfere with an individual's right to
worship. 8°
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Olmer gives weight to the
premise that free speech is at the top of a hierarchy of constitutional
rights. This decision, and the later denial of an en banc hearing,
seem to indicate that the Eighth Circuit will continue to follow an
extremely strict approach when faced with ordinances restricting
focused picketing outside houses of worship. However, precedent
would allow regulation controlling the when, where, and how of
expressive conduct based on a balance between a person's right to
protest and another's right to unobstructed access to her place of
worship.
The Constitution provides an assortment of rights. Free speech
is clearly one of them; privacy is another. The Supreme Court has
not automatically advanced free speech rights over other constitu-
tionally protected interests, but has engaged in a balancing act.''
174. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1187 (Bright, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 1187 (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Bright compared this ordinance
to the ordinance upheld in Frisby as similarly prohibiting only a discrete type of
expression. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting).
176. 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
177. See Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1187 (Bright, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 1188 (Bright, J., dissenting).
179. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting).
180. See id. (Bright, J., dissenting).
181. See generally KALVEN, supra note 138 (examining the development of free
speech doctrine). See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975)
("This Court has... pitt[ed] the First Amendment rights of speakers against the privacy
rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors-in a variety of contexts.
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Recognizing that "enforc[ing] freedom of speech in disregard of the
rights of others [is] harsh and arbitrary in itself,"'"2 the Supreme
Court has upheld restrictions intended to protect those who cannot
escape from the psychological impact of focused picketing. s3 The
Supreme Court's ruling in Frisby balanced free speech rights and the
privacy interests inherent in protecting listeners from unwanted
communication in important settings, such as the home.
However, the Eighth Circuit chose a limited interpretation of
Frisby. Instead of allowing time, place, and manner restrictions
based on the picketers' intent to harass and coerce, the court
narrowed Frisby's application to personal residences.'84 In the
context of exposing vulnerable families with small children and
other worshipers to unwanted assaults of graphic depictions of
abortions from which they could not escape if they chose to attend
church, the Eighth Circuit's ruling is particularly harsh. In Olmer,
the Eighth Circuit seems to choose a very narrow view of what
rights are worthy of protection.
The privacy of churchgoers is as constitutionally important as
the privacy of homeowners. People should not be forced to endure
a "gauntlet" to attend the church of their choice. The "special
nature of the place" plays an important role in deciding whether
Such cases demand delicate balancing .... ) (internal citations omitted).
182. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
183. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (acknowledging
states' strong interest in medical privacy because targeted picketing of a clinic threatens
the psychological well-being of "captive" audience); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
486 (1988) (recognizing the psychological effects of targeted picketing on an
individual's family life).
184. During the time this note was going through the publication process the
Supreme Court decided Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000). In Hill, the Court held
constitutional a state statute prohibiting demonstrators from knowingly approaching
within eight feet of individuals who were within 100 feet of health care facility
entrances. Id. at 2499. Discussing the confrontational aspect of the protests, the Court
quoted testimony from legislative hearings indicating that protesters were "'flashing
bloody fetus signs,"' yelling, and thrusting signs in people's faces. Id. at 2486 n.7
(quoting from Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1250-51 (Colo. 1999)). The Court noted
when conducting its analysis "the significant difference between state restrictions on
a speaker's right to address a willing audience and those that protect listeners from
unwanted communication." Id. at 2489. The Court further stated that "[t]he right to
avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of the home, and its immediate
surroundings, but can also be protected in confrontational settings." Id. at 2490. During
an examination of the Colorado statutes' interpretation of picketing, the Court
commented that its previous holdings had recognized "that statutes can equally restrict
all 'picketing.'" Id. at 2492 n.30. However, cities enacting legislation similar to the
Lincoln, Nebraska ordinance may achieve better results by defining a floating buffer
zone area similar to one used in Hill.
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speech can be regulated.'85 Houses of worship are traditionally
regarded as special places for many reasons. In addition to being
"spiritual homes," churches often serve as focal points for commu-
nity outreach and activities. Cities have an significant interest in
controlling conduct at these places even when they are located in
what are traditionally public locations.
By understating the significance of the government's interest in
protecting religious worshipers from confrontational and harassing
messages, the Eighth Circuit established a rigid standard for
communities attempting to regulate this type of expressive conduct.
Protestors, prevented from engaging in harassing focused picketing
at homes and medical offices can, after Olmer, continue to picket
churches. Cities are left without guidelines for limiting the time,
place, and manner of focused picketing near religious sites.
Ordinances modeled on Frisby are now of questionable validity in
light of the Olmer decision.
Learning to live in our society calls for acquiring some level of
tolerance for the viewpoints of others. The First Amendment's free
speech clause may require that people occasionally be subjected to
speech they find disturbing or insulting. 86  However, there is a
difference between being subjected to another viewpoint and being
subjected to expressive conduct that infringes on an individual's
exercise of a constitutional right.'87 Balancing these rights is not an
easy task. Reviewing state restrictions attempting to protect one
right at the expense of another unquestionably provides courts with
a challenge.'88  In this case, the ability of unwilling listeners to
attend church peaceably took a back seat to protestors' speech
rights.
Patti Stanley*
185. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972).
186. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). "[Speech] may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Id.
187. See Phelps, supra note 10, at 284.
188. See Brownstein, supra note 110, at 1199.
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